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We explore the ability of a macroprudential policy instrument to dampen the 
consequences of equity mispricing (a bubble) and the correction thereof (the bubble 
bursting), as well as the consequences for real activity in a production economy. In our 
model, producers are financed by both bank debt and equity, and face a mix of systemic 
and idiosyncratic uncertainty. Positive/negative bubbles arise when prior public beliefs 
about the aggregate productivity of producers (business sentiment) become biased 
upwards/downwards. Economic activity in equilibrium is influenced by the bubble size in 
conjunction with agency problems caused by delegation of lending to relationship 
bankers. The presence of macroprudential policy is manifested in a convex dependence of 
bank capital requirements on the quantity of uncollateralized credit. We find that this kind 
of policy is more successful in suppressing equity price swings than moderating output 
fluctuations. At the same time, economic activity recoils substantially with the 
introduction of a macroprudential instrument, so that its presence is likely to entail 
tangible welfare costs. In this regard, fine-tuning capital charges as a function of 
corporate governance on the borrower side (specifically, by discouraging limited liability 
of borrowing firm managers) would be less costly than placing the full burden of 
prudential regulation on the lender side. 
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Nontechnical Summary 
Asset price bubbles, i.e., price deviations from fundamentals due to the prevalence of self-
fulfilling incorrect beliefs in the market, are known to have long-lasting implications for the real 
economy. They cause all the more severe misallocation of resources in the presence of significant 
amounts of bank credit to the real sector, i.e., when the economy is leveraged. Moreover, the latest 
global financial crisis has provided abundant examples of spillovers from financial market 
corrections after a burst bubble to painful disruptions of economic activity. 
Financial sector regulators are usually unable to provide a prompt remedy when a crisis is already 
in full progress, whereas the monetary policy potential is often quickly exhausted by the zero 
interest rate bound and limits to quantitative easing. Therefore, a lot of attention is now being 
dedicated to the second pillar of policy response to asset price developments, i.e., the group of so-
called macroprudential instruments (such as counter-cyclical capital buffers, loan-to-value ratios, 
leverage limits, variable risk weights, and collateral requirements). Although the use of 
macroprudential policy tools is primarily motivated by financial stability considerations, public 
debate often associates with them the power to contain the adverse real implications of asset price 
bubbles as well. However, the impact of macroprudential policies on the supply side of the 
economy remains to be analyzed in proper depth, given the lack of both generally accepted 
theories and sufficient empirical evidence. 
To formally address any of the topics pertaining to the real implications of financial market 
excesses and their correction by policy, one needs a model of financial frictions affecting 
investment and production. The present paper contributes to this objective by proposing a model 
of imperfect financial intermediaries in a production economy. The model contains a rationale for 
equity bubbles as a consequence of incorrect prior public beliefs about aggregate productivity that 
persist in the distorted share prices notwithstanding unbiased signals provided to lenders by 
borrowers. The macroprudential policy that we introduce into this environment amounts to 
applying convexly growing regulatory capital charges on banks that lend to firms with a low 
relative size of own equity. Thus, we address the informational source of asset price bubbles and 
operationalize macroprudential policy in an environment with combined debt and equity markets. 
Such a synthesis is, to the best of our knowledge, novel to the literature. In this paper, a two-
period setup is discussed, mainly for reasons of economy of space, although a multi-period 
generalization would be straightforward. 
Summarizing our main findings, we first establish that there are real economic costs of both 
positive and negative bubbles, regardless of the prior bias sign. Second, macroprudential capital 
surcharges on banks marginally increase the benign reaction of the economy to the removal of a 
bubble and reduce loss-given-default levels; however, they also have a strong depressing effect on 
economic activity without any reduction of default rates. Essentially, this type of macroprudential 
policy is much better at fighting the symptoms (deviations of asset prices from their fundamental 
levels) than the underlying disease (suboptimal capital allocation) itself. Third, limited liability of 
borrowers exacerbates the consequences of bubbles. Accordingly, introducing more downside risk 
at default for managers of borrower firms would achieve better bubble containment than 
macroprudential capital surcharges. Fourth, monetary and macroprudential policies can have Financial Frictions, Bubbles, and Macroprudential Policies   3 
 
surprisingly similar aggregate effects, although the latter, by offering lenders a better opportunity 
to extract rents from borrowers, may be preferred by the banking sector. 
 
1. Introduction 
Asset price bubbles, i.e., asset prices deviating from fundamentals due to the prevalence of self-
fulfilling incorrect beliefs in the market, are known to have long-lasting implications for the real 
economy. They cause both misallocation of resources while emerging and severe disruptions of 
economic activity when the eventual price correction (bubble bursting) takes place, all the more 
so in the presence of significant amounts of bank credit to the real sector, i.e., when the economy 
is leveraged. The latest global financial crisis has provided abundant examples of sudden 
breakdown of credit relationships when poorly informed investors revised their previously held 
views. The aggregate magnitude of the ensuing negative financing shock was big enough to make 
the financial crisis go over into a worldwide recession. Although initially only a minority of 
financial institutions were affected by adverse balance sheet developments, businesses seemed to 
have difficulty finding a replacement for their original lender when the latter became either 
distressed or overcautious.  
In the face of a crisis already in full progress, financial sector regulators are unable to provide a 
prompt remedy, whereas the monetary policy potential is often quickly exhausted by the zero 
interest rate boundary and limits to quantitative easing. That is why interest in the second pillar of 
policy response to asset price developments, i.e., the group of so-called macroprudential 
instruments, is on the rise.
1 However, the impact of macroprudential policies on the supply side of 
the economy remains to be analyzed in proper depth, given the lack of both generally accepted 
theories and sufficient empirical evidence. 
The present paper seeks to contribute to the objective of understanding the mutual workings of 
asset price bubbles and macroprudential policies by proposing a model of imperfect financial 
intermediaries in a production economy. To this end, we set up an environment in which firms 
seek both equity and debt financing under partial opacity: some uncertainties in producer 
performance are, in principle, resolvable in advance of the financing decision when the 
appropriate asset management regime is chosen, but incentives in financial institutions may work 
against the resolution. Other, systemic uncertainties may initially be perceived with a bias by 
investors, leading to mispricing of both equity and debt and, consequently, to distorted capital 
formation and output losses in the affected real sector. 
Specifically, firms have production functions with two risky components in their total factor 
productivity. The first is a systemic risk factor with a distribution function known to everyone. In 
addition, there is a firm-specific component (the firm’s type) which is known to the firm 
management but cannot be precisely and credibly communicated to either equity investors or 
wholesale banks. The firm manager can only send a public signal about the productivity level as a 
whole, in which systemic uncertainty contaminates the message about the idiosyncratic 
                                                           
1 What is usually meant are regulatory guidelines regarding, inter alia, counter-cyclical capital buffers, loan-to-
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productivity component value. Only a loan manager with specific expertise (a retail relationship 
banker) has the necessary non-transferrable skills to learn the borrowing firm’s type.
2 Such a 
delegated manager can be hired by the wholesale bank for a fee to set the lending rate and collect 
the proceeds. 
The first distinguishing feature of the model is that return on real investment is affected by a 
specific input required by the corporate governance mechanism in place in the firm. The input can 
be thought of as a separate strain of managerial human capital related to production (not to be 
mixed up with knowledge about technology type, as in the previously mentioned relationship 
banker case). It is firm-specific and, consequently, no individual is able to distribute its provision 
among all firms. This circumstance works as an obstacle to full-fledged diversification of equity 
holdings by retail investors.
3 For simplicity, we concentrate on the extreme case by assuming that 
each of the retail investors can only observe the human capital level in a single firm. Then, by 
selecting the right parameters one can generate an economy in which holding shares in other firms 
is strictly dominated by only holding shares of the firm whose human capital level one knows. 
Thus, equity financing is possible but share demand only comes from a subset of knowledgeable 
investors. 
Another key element of the model is a specific rationale for the existence of banks. Since, as 
agreed, the circle of possible equity holders of each firm is limited, firms also seek debt financing, 
whereas retail investors look for opportunities to substitute for missing equity portfolio 
diversification by holding deposits. As opposed to retail investors, the bank (we use the term 
wholesale bank) can lend to any firm. That is why it can present itself as a diversifying 
intermediary but, at the same time, extract rents as an exclusive operator of the necessary financial 
technology. 
Due to the mentioned technological exclusivity, the bank, or better said, the financial services 
sector as a whole, has considerable market power. This is why the well-known agency problem of 
fund diversion becomes important. According to our view, a financial institution sells claims to 
the public (here, collects deposits from retail investors) by declaring one investment pattern for 
the proceeds, whereas the actual management of borrowed funds follows a different pattern as far 
as it cannot be fully contracted and verified. The bank accepts deposits with the declared objective 
to invest them optimally in the whole spectrum of available firms, i.e., to diversify retail 
investors’ funds for them. Naturally, returns on lending to every individual firm are higher if its 
type (the idiosyncratic component of its technology level) is observed, so that the wholesale bank 
is supposed to delegate to a relationship banker. However, the latter, being the exclusive holder of 
firm-specific knowledge, has considerable bargaining power vis-à-vis the wholesale bank. 
Therefore, he can drive the required fee up to the level at which the wholesale bank becomes 
                                                           
2 For simplicity, we only consider the case in which the loan manager finds out the type precisely, i.e., knows the 
same thing as the firm manager. Generalizations allowing the relationship banker to learn the type with a noise, 
although with a higher precision than the public, are possible but do not add much to the qualitative insights of 
the model. 
3 One can imagine that every retail investor is specialized in a particular economic sector represented by a set of 
identical firms. This is the sector to which the investor supplies his own human capital (this time in a managerial 
capacity, so that specialization generates a learning-by-doing effect) and, as a result, has sufficient expertise to 
pick the right stock within the sector, but not outside it. Alternatively, one could imagine a household of two, 
with one member supplying equity financing and the other member supplying human capital input to a single 
familiar industry. Financial Frictions, Bubbles, and Macroprudential Policies   5 
 
indifferent between employing his services and managing the loan itself based on public 
information alone. Then, it may happen that negotiations with the retail banker break down, 
delegation does not take place, and the loan is managed by the wholesale bank “at arm’s length”. 
In the extreme, these arm’s length loans can be packaged, tranched, and sold to other banks in 
CDO form. And, at times, this can even be preferable both subjectively (the wholesale bank earns 
more on its loan portfolio) and socially (lower interest rates on average, more investment of debt-
financed capital, and hence higher output). The problem is that the outcome is sensitive, among 
other things, to the quality of public information. 
This brings us to the third key element of the model: public sentiment as a source of equity price 
bubbles. Namely, we propose the following mechanism of rationalizing the emergence of bubbles. 
We take public information about firms’ types to be a Bayesian update of a prior belief 
distribution by an unbiased signal coming from the firm. If the prior distribution is biased, we say 
that there exists (prejudiced) public sentiment. Since each firm’s public signal is noisy, the prior 
belief update, although able to reduce the bias, is unable to completely eliminate it. Accordingly, 
prior prejudice impacts on equilibrium equity prices, lending rates, investment volumes, and 
output. It is easy to demonstrate that the firm equity price is above/below the unbiased prior 
sentiment benchmark when the bias sign is positive/negative. In that case, we talk about a 
positive/negative bubble. Numerical examples in sections 4 and 5 will illustrate the extent of this 
effect relative to the accompanying loss of output, the price of credit, and default frequencies. 
In the extreme, our model allows for accommodating the real consequences of a burst bubble as a 
manifestation of equilibrium breakdown. For instance, assume that there are just two productivity 
types, high and low. A priori, both the retail investors and the wholesale bankers may believe that 
there are more low productivity firms (the mass of the low type is greater than ½ – pessimistic 
sentiment), whereas in truth, the high and low types both have mass ½. (Other possible 
combinations of truth and sentiment are discussed in section 4.) It is possible that, under a 
particular sentiment and other exogenous parameter values, there exists an equilibrium with 
delegated loan management but no equilibrium with arm’s length management. So, in that case, if 
wholesale-retail banker bargaining about the compensation of the latter is unsuccessful, there is a 
big group of firms (in the binary example above, all low-type ones) that cease to operate because 
they cannot finance production with either equity or debt, and there is a considerable reduction in 
output.
4 However, more common are situations in which both bubble-free and bubbly equilibria 
exist, but the latter are associated with a reduction of economic activity. 
Although the use of macroprudential policy tools is primarily motivated by financial stability 
considerations, public debate often associates with them the power to contain the adverse real 
implications of asset price bubbles as well. We try to give a formal structure to this debate by 
introducing a macroprudential instrument in the potentially bubbly environment outlined above. 
Namely, we investigate the impact of additional (and convexly growing) regulatory capital 
charges on banks that lend to firms with a low relative size of own equity. Although the true 
advantages and disadvantages of such policy instruments can only become fully visible in a 
dynamic model (whereas ours is a two-period one), we are nevertheless able to gauge the basic 
qualitative consequences of the said policy for economic fundamentals within each period. 
                                                           
4 This effect generated by the model, as we believe, offers a plausible imitation of at least some instances of the 
transition from “purely financial” revision of beliefs and the corresponding turbulence in asset markets, to the 
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Summarizing our main findings, we establish that 
A.  there are real economic costs of both positive and negative bubbles, regardless of the prior 
bias sign; 
B.  macroprudential capital surcharges on banks marginally increase the benign reaction of 
the economy to the removal of a bubble; however, they also have a strong depressing 
effect on economic activity without any reduction of default rates; 
C.  limited liability of borrowers exacerbates the consequences of bubbles. Introducing more 
downside risk at default for managers of borrower firms, by reducing sensitivity to 
exogenous parameters, achieves better bubble containment than macroprudential capital 
surcharges. In addition, equilibria in this “proportional liability” regime are associated 
with reduced default rates for the most risky borrowers, compared to the pure limited 
liability case. 
In this paper, we discuss a two-period setup, mainly for reasons of economy of space, although a 
multi-period generalization would constitute no conceptual problem. 
To the best of our knowledge, a model that addresses the informational source of asset price 
bubbles and operationalizes macroprudential policy in an environment with combined debt and 
(insider) equity markets, is a novel contribution, although departing points for its individual 
elements can be found in the literature. The next subsection puts our research in the context of 
relevant contributions in the area of financial friction modeling. 
2. Related Literature  
In an ideal (“Modigliani-Miller”) world of competitive and efficient financial intermediation, 
there is no place for asset price bubbles. On the contrary, practitioners in the areas of monetary 
and financial regulation policy are permanently faced by consequences of bubbles and mobilize 
all sorts of analytical tools to understand them (see Hunter et al., 2005, for a survey; the principle 
conclusion of this collection of papers is a failure to identify bubbles in real time but a hope to 
design policies that would induce agents to partly endogenize them). Still, the efficient markets 
assumption is a popular (while convenient) shortcut in macro models. Although more recent 
DSGE-with-financial-frictions models assign a place to the financial sector, they usually rely on a 
properly functioning financial intermediary as a propagator of real shocks. But the latest global 
crisis, and particularly the extent of the credit decline at its peak, has uncovered a certain deficit of 
attention to improperly functioning financial intermediaries as a shock source. However, the bulk 
of the existing macro literature is preoccupied with orderly market operation, conceding but 
modest space to shortcomings both on the capital provider and capital consumer sides. 
Investigations into the interplay of financial and real shocks on the macro level have not been too 
numerous. The concept of costly state verification (CSV) in contract theory (Townsend, 1979) has 
been widely used in real business cycle models (first of all by suggesting the appropriate way of 
modeling default on debt contracts). Inspired by CSV models, the financial accelerator 
construction of Bernanke et al. (1999) has been an influential example of feeding a financial 
sector factor into quantitative macroeconomic theory. However, the (fulfilled) objective of 
Bernanke et al. (1999) was to codify, not necessarily explain, the main realities of financial sector Financial Frictions, Bubbles, and Macroprudential Policies   7 
 
presence in the economy, as they strived to reflect empirically important business cycle 
phenomena related to financial frictions. In essence, Bernanke et al. (1999) and the succeeding 
DSGE-with-financial-frictions models (e.g. Christiano et al., 2008) accommodate plausible 
sources of financial shocks through an ingenious choice of free parameters in otherwise standard 
optimization problems of agents. As the very term “financial accelerator” suggests, the financial 
sector shapes the real shock propagation mechanism in the economy, but does not itself originate 
the events of interest in these models, as capital suppliers do not possess sufficient pre-requisites 
with regard to either standing in the market or informational endowments.
5 Therefore, they are 
unable to “misbehave” in a natural way (e.g. in terms of adverse selection, reputation, incomplete 
contracts, herding behavior, etc.) along the lines drawn by the financial intermediation theory. The 
latter, on the other hand, relies on toy models which provide only very indirect, if any, empirical 
guidance. Another insufficiently developed link in the current state of the financial accelerator 
literature is that with the asset pricing theory. Naturally, the latter, to the degree it is trapped in the 
efficient market paradigm, does not make synergies any easier. With the outbreak of the global 
crisis in 2007, a more in-depth synergetic analysis received an unprecedented impulse, but 
relevant contributions are naturally taking time to materialize. Therefore, most literature to the 
point is quite recent and many inspiring studies still exist in a preliminary form only. 
Logically, in the course of the latest crisis, interest has turned to the propagation of real effects of 
financial shocks proper, so that empirical evidence of such propagation will no doubt soon abound 
(see, for example, Campello et al., 2009, for an up-to-date contribution). At the same time, the 
new wave of attention devoted to the role of monetary policy in the run-up to financial crises has 
rekindled interest in formal modeling of macro-prudential policy tools that augment standard 
Taylor rule-based interest rate policies. Although the necessity and value added of the 
macroprudential view of both financial regulation and monetary policy was recognized early 
enough (see Borio, 2003, for a survey), the latest global financial crisis has delivered a new strong 
impulse for its development. Already, quantitative assessments, based on tentative synthetic 
techniques, have been conducted under the impression of the financial crisis and global recession 
(see, for example, Chapter III of the IMF October 2009 World Economic Outlook). The exercise 
done there uses the approach inspired by, inter alia, Aoki et al. (2004), Iacoviello (2005), and 
Monacelli (2009). Naturally, a proper quantitative analysis of the workings of those additional 
instruments requires a more explicit role of financial intermediation than was usual in earlier 
macro models. Our paper constitutes a step in this direction, as we propose a fairly general way of 
introducing macroprudential instruments in a production economy with a financial sector. Unlike 
some other recent contributions that, although taking both corporate and bank default into 
consideration, leave systemic driving factors of default outside the model (de Walque et al., 
2010), we preserve the main features of the risky lending paradigm of the financial intermediation 
literature (see, for example, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
                                                           
5 One example is the full competitiveness assumption, which imposes the zero-profit constraint on lenders. What 
may be a gain in analytic convenience (a reduction of the number of free parameters) is also a loss in flexibility, 
since the market power of the lender is a feature one would really want to be able to model. Besides, it is often 
overlooked that zero profit is a two-way “egalitarian” constraint: not just is economic profit prohibited, but also 
losses are ruled out. But to model a bank without a downside risk would be nearly irrelevant for meaningful 
applications, for which claim at least the reality of the latest crisis, even if nothing else, provides enough 
evidence. 8   Alexis Derviz 
 
 
Our model output testifies to high sensitivity of economic activity in equilibrium to the incentives 
within the borrowing firms, delegation within financial intermediaries, and the marginal rate of 
prudential capital charges. As regards the first two factors, our results are akin to the body of 
knowledge within the strand of literature that describes the far-reaching implications of the 
manager incentive scheme choice under separation of ownership and control in DSGE models (cf. 
Donaldson et al., 2009). Awareness of the costs of the third (non-linear capital charge) factor has 
so far been widespread among practitioners. The present model complements this awareness with 
a micro-founded analysis.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 explains the construction of the model. 
Section 4 introduces a parametric version of the model, which we solve numerically. In that 
section, outcomes of various numeric experiments in the presence of equity price bubbles are 
reproduced. Then, in section 5, we experiment with the interplay between the bubbles and a 
macro-prudential policy instrument that generates non-linear charges on non-collateralized loans, 
and confront the outcome with the effect of modifying borrower liability in default. Section 6 
outlines possibilities of further research and concludes. 
 
3. Model 
The economy offers a set L of production capacities, or industries, that also serve as opportunities 
to invest. Each production capacity has its own c.r.s. production function to be described later, 
with inputs provided in period one generating stochastic revenue in period two. All inputs, 
investment, and output are expressed in terms of a single unit of account. There are two periods 
and three groups of agents: retail investors, firm managers (or simply firms), and banks. The latter 
group has two tiers: wholesale banks and relationship banks. Next, we describe the objectives and 
choices of the named agents one by one. 
 
3.1 Retail Investors 
Each retail investor has a stock of initial wealth w0 and a stock ml of non-transferable expertise in 
exactly one industry l∈L. This human capital is sold to some firm from l (they are assumed 
identical) in period 1 at price z
l. For simplicity, we assume that human capital supply is inelastic, 
i.e., the whole stock ml is sold regardless of the value of z
l. This same investor, or the second 
member of the same household, can use cash w0+z
lml available in period 1 to either buy shares in 




l is the total factor productivity parameter. Exact expressions will be given in 
the next subsection. The important point is that since another member of the same household 
supplies firm-specific human capital to l, the retail investor household knows the exact levels of 
inputs in the production function. Therefore, even though productivity realization in period 2 is 
uncertain, the degree of uncertainty is much lower than it would be if the investor decided to buy 
shares in another industry n∈L. For an outsider, only return y
n without a breakdown into factor 
inputs and productivity would be known, which would combine the uncertainties over A
n, 
physical capital kn (see section 3.2 on firms below), and mn. Without going into technical detail, 
we assume that the resulting uncertainty is so high that it is too risky and hence never optimal for 
any retail investor to reduce share holdings in his “own” industry and buy shares in outside ones. Financial Frictions, Bubbles, and Macroprudential Policies   9 
 
If the investor buys xl shares in industry l at price p
l (which he takes as exogenous), his wealth in 





l x p m z w i y x w − + + + = 0 ) 1 ( . 
This final wealth, which is uncertain due to the uncertainty in A
l, enters the investor’s utility 
function, whose conditional expectation in period 1 is maximized with respect to the admissible 
choices of xl. The interval of admissible choices is [0,1]. This means that the number of shares in 
each industry is normalized to unity and short-selling is not allowed. 
Denote the investor’s utility by U and his subjective beliefs about the distribution of A
l-values by 
ϕ. We will only consider continuous non-atomic distributions, so that ϕ is a well-defined density. 
Then the investor solves the problem 
( ) () ∫ − + + +
≤ ≤






) ( ) 1 ( ) ( sup 0
1 0
ϕ .    (1) 
 
The outcome can be either an internal solution characterized by the first-order condition 






l ϕ  (2) 
or a corner solution in situations where the left-hand side of (2) does not change sign for xl∈(0,1). 
We will exclude from consideration the trivial corner solution xl=0 (which corresponds to firms 
without any outside equity capital) and consider the remaining cases. 
The internal solution is the one conventionally exploited by finance theory. In conjunction with 
the standard assumptions of identical investors (applied to our setting, this means a representative 
retail investor with special expertise in industry l, for each l separately) and market clearing (the 
representative investor holds xl=1) it can be restated as 
 
( ) ( )
() ∫
− + + + ′
+
= dA A A y
p m z M










l ) ( ) (
,
) 1 ( ) (
1
1 0 ϕ ,   (3) 
with  () () ∫ − + + + ′ = dA A p h w i A y U p h M ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , ( 0 ϕ . 
Expression (3) can be interpreted as the expected payout on firm l stock discounted by the 
subjective stochastic discount factor. The value of the latter under productivity realization A is 
equal to 1/(1+i) times the investor’s marginal utility U′ under A, normalized by expected 
marginal utility, M.
6 But, whereas standard asset pricing theories concentrate on the market 
pricing of risk that follows from the properties of the stochastic discount factor, we will keep in 
                                                           
6 In those extensions of the model which contain the retail investor’s consumption in period one, M is equal to 
the marginal utility of consumption in period one, as a consequence of the Euler equation. 10   Alexis Derviz 
 
 
mind that the right-hand side of (3) also depends on p
l, and look at (3) as an equation which 
determines this price implicitly.
7 
Additionally, we are interested in the corner solution xl=1 which obtains when the objective 
function (1) of the representative retail investor is increasing in xl on the whole interval (0,1). 
Equivalently, the left-hand side of (2) is everywhere positive in xl and the investor actually gets to 
pay for the whole available stock the price below the expected discounted payout: 
 
( ) ( )
() ∫
− + + + ′
+
< dA A A y
p m z M










l ) ( ) (
,
) 1 ( ) (
1
1 0 ϕ .   (3C) 
Naturally, there may be a whole continuum of prices satisfying this inequality. This situation is 
indeed possible and gives rise to multiple equilibria – an additional source of potential volatility 
not just in asset prices, but also in interest rates, investment levels, and output. As was mentioned 
in the introduction, a switch from a unique equilibrium implied by the internal price solution (3) 
to equilibrium multiplicity corresponding to a continuum of corner price solutions (3C) is possible 
by a mere shift of sentiment (a formal definition and extended discussion of the latter can be 
found in section 4). 
 
3.2 Firms 
Firms have c.r.s. production functions with uncertain productivity and transform physical capital k 
and human capital m into output. The internal funds of the firm are insufficient to cover 
production costs, so it seeks external financing in both equity and debt form. The firm is a price-
taker in both those markets. Recall that equity is sold to a subset of retail investors (those who 
observe the human capital input into the same firm), whereas debt financing is reserved to banks. 
Incorporating the experience of costly state verification modeling (Townsend, 1979), we assume 
that even delegated loan managers of relationship banks are unable to observe the human capital 
input with enough precision to support a state-contingent (equity) contract. This allows us to 
exclude from consideration the case of banks holding equity. 
For the time being, unless this causes ambiguity, we will omit the industry index l when 
discussing a firm’s actions. 
Human capital input m must be paid for up-front in period 1. For simplicity, we assume that firms 
do not have initial cash holdings to do this. So a firm using m units of human capital has to 
borrow from banks at least the amount zm. More borrowing may be needed to finance physical 
capital, for which the identity k =k0+p+b holds. Here, k0 is the initial non-traded “foundation” 
stock, i.e., the stock held by the company founders, p is the “market capitalization”, i.e., the value 
                                                           
7 Note that, being an equation which generalizes the conventional asset-pricing formulae, (3) introduces an 
equity market-based (co-)determination mechanism for physical capital. Such a mechanism is absent from the 
existing financial accelerator models. Financial Frictions, Bubbles, and Macroprudential Policies   11 
 
of shares sold in the equity market (recall that we have normalized the number of shares to unity), 
and, finally, b is the physical capital financed by a bank loan. 
In the second period, the firm produces Af(k,m) units of output. We assume that the whole stock of 
physical capital is then released as a part of firm earnings so that, in total, they are equal to 
Af(k,m)+k. (Since this is a two-period model, it makes little sense to consider capital depreciation 
explicitly.) Recall that in period 2, the m-input has already been paid for from bank credit.
8 So, the 
dividend to stockholders is equal to what remains of the output after the total debt, i.e., zm+b, is 
serviced. Default occurs if output is not enough to repay the debt, in which case the bank seizes all 
earnings. Let the lending rate be r (taken by the firm as given, see more in the next subsection). 
Formally, shareholder dividends are 
{ } 0 ), )( 1 ( ) , ( max ) ( b zm r k m k Af A y + + − + = . 
If the firm does not default, this dividend can also be written as 
Af(q+b,m)+q-(1+r)zm-rb,       ( 4 )  
where q=k0+p is total equity capital (traded and non-traded).
9 
Each firm is run by a risk-neutral manager. For simplicity, we assume that he acts in the best 
interest of the shareholders (i.e., we abstract from agency effects in the shareholder-firm manager 
relationship). That is, the manager’s objective is to maximize the expected dividend. The 
important nuance is that the said expectations are formed on the basis of the manager’s superior 
knowledge of productivity.
10 Namely, we assume that productivity is a product of two 
components:  A=LS, of which S is the systemic uncertainty, perceived by everybody in this 
economy as a random variable with known distribution (for simplicity, let it be the same 
distribution for all firms). On the other hand, L is the firm-specific component, whose exact 
realization is known to the manager (and also to the relationship banker; see subsection 3.3 below) 
but not to either the retail investor or the wholesale bank.
11 
                                                           
8 In this way, we avoid the need to account for the consequences of possible firm default on payment to m-
suppliers. In principle, we could have defined a contract with m-suppliers receiving payment in period 2. Then, 
under default, these claimholders would have been pooled with the lending bank for the purposes of debt 
resolution. However, this would have meant unnecessary technical complications without a contribution to the 
main task of the present analysis, which is to explore the real consequences of interactions between firms and 
banks. In addition, the used cash-in-advance constraint for m-supply allows us to simultaneously equip the model 
with both a liquidity constraint on the borrower side and a source of leverage. The latter emerges because 
(section 3.1) the sum of zm across retail investors acts both as the cash deposited by them in banks (in excess of 
the initial wealth) and the lower bound of the credit volume granted by banks to firms. 
9 Note the difference between our q-variable and the net worth variable of Bernanke et al. (1999) and successors: 
since the latter (financial-frictions) models do not have explicit equity markets, their net worth value is 
monolithic, whereas ours is naturally split into foundation and traded stock. 
10 One can compare this feature with Bernanke et al. (1999) and successor models: these, too, contain both 
aggregate and firm-specific uncertainty, but the role of the former is played down, at a fairly high cost for the 
interpretation of results. Indeed, when systemic uncertainty is present, Bernanke et al. (1999) do not even have a 
proper debt contract in the model, and the state-contingent hybrid they have to use instead is quite difficult to 
rationalize. On the contrary, our model faces systemic uncertainty as a key fundamental factor and lets it play a 
due role in both equity and debt pricing. 
11 Exact L-knowledge by both the firm manager and the delegated loan manager (relationship banker) is a useful 
technical simplification which, on the other hand, is not central to the qualitative results. What is important is 12   Alexis Derviz 
 
 
Let us assume that there are exactly as many firms (industries) as there are productivity types. 
Then, our use of the same letter to index the firm set L  (lowercase  l) and firm-specific 
productivity value (uppercase L, and lowercase l for its log) should not cause confusion. 
The firm manager takes the offered lending rate r and the m-price z as given. It is natural to 
assume that the equity price p and the overall level of equity capital q are also exogenous to him. 
He decides on optimal levels of m and b knowing that in default, the dividend he strives to 
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= .       ( 5 )  
Therefore, his dividend expectation is calculated over realizations of S exceeding S
d. Let us denote 
the cumulative distribution function of S by X and the corresponding density by χ. The survival 
probability is then X
+(S
d)=1-X(S
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Note that  ( )
d S θ  is the expected systemic productivity component conditioned on survival. 
Lemma 1 Given the equity capital level q, human capital price z, and lending rate r, the optimal 
decisions of a firm of productivity type L on m and b are characterized by the first-order 
conditions 
( ) z r m b q Lf S m
d ) 1 ( ) , ( + = + θ ,      ( 6 a )  
( ) r m b q Lf S k
d = + ) , ( θ .      (6b) 
(In (6), subscripts denote partial derivatives.) The proof is straightforward given that, when 
calculating expected dividends, the firm manager integrates only over realizations of S that exceed 
S
d. As a consequence, the marginal products enter the first-order condition with the tail 
expectation multiplier  ( )
d S
+ Ψ , whereas the remaining part of the partial derivative of the 
dividend expression (5) does so with the survival probability multiplier X
+(S
d). 
Since we assume a fixed supply of m, (6a) will be interpreted as a market-clearing condition for z, 
i.e., characterization of the human capital price that equalizes the fixed supply with the demand 
determined by the marginal product of m. The second optimality condition, (6b), is an implicit 
characterization of the credit demand b=B(r) as a – decreasing – function of the lending rate 
charged. This is the firm manager’s reaction function in the game it plays with the bank (see 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that the degree of knowledge on the firm and the relationship bank side, even if different, is higher than that of 
the retail investor and the wholesale bank. 
12 Although this cutoff value is formally analogous to similar parameters used by Bernanke et al. (1999), 
Christiano et al. (2008), and related models (the usual notation there is ω ), one should keep in mind that our 
critical productivity value refers to systemic uncertainty realizations conditional on the given firm-specific 
uncertainty, whereas the named papers work with the firm-specific component. Financial Frictions, Bubbles, and Macroprudential Policies   13 
 
section 3.3 and the subsequent section). Naturally, B also depends on q, z, and the parameters of 
the model, but we omit them for simplicity in the notation. 
Remark Since the production function is c.r.s., by combining (5), (6), and the Euler identity one 
arrives at the following condition for the survival threshold S
d: 









− =θ .       ( 7 )  
In (7),  ) ( ˆ d S b  is the optimal choice of b implied by (6). The above condition is an equation for S
d 
whose solution depends on z, r, and q as parameters. The problem is that for typical distributions, 
production functions, and a subset of otherwise realistic parameter values, this equation may have 
either two solutions or none at all. In the latter case, equilibrium equity+debt financing of such a 
firm cannot exist either, regardless of the presence of other firm types in the economy. In the 
former case, there emerges a possibility of two equilibria corresponding to high/low debt-financed 
levels of capital and high/low default probability in this firm type. Thus, our model is able to 
imitate real economic instability as a result of tiny financial shocks (see more in section 5). 
Now assume that the firm manager maximizes the unconditional expectation of after-interest 
earnings (i.e., including the expectation over those S-realizations that would make net earnings 
negative in the absence of limited liability). Such a manager will borrow the following “unlimited 
liability” quantity of funds: 
z r m b q Lf S m ) 1 ( ) , ( + = + ,       ( 6 a U L )  
r m b q Lf S k = + ) , (        ( 6 b U L )  
(Recall that S  is the unconditional mean of systemic productivity component S.) That is, 
although the default consequences for the lender are the same as in the limited liability case, i.e., 
the bank seizes the output, whose value is insufficient to repay the debt in full, the manager 
behaves “as if” he bore the full brunt of insolvency. To make managers behave like that, one 
would need, for example, a compensation scheme that is a function of after-interest earnings, e.g. 
a fixed fee, plus a percentage of actual – positive or negative – earnings. Similar remuneration 
schemes of “proportional liability” form, also in a much more general setting than the present one, 
have been considered by, for instance, Hui (2003). 
In any event, firm choices based on (6UL) instead of (6) lead to the following analogue of (7): 
) , (
) 1 (






− = .     (7UL) 
Now, the default threshold is uniquely determined by the endogenous variables b, q, and r and the 
parameters of the model, i.e., the problem of equilibrium indeterminacy disappears. 
Unfortunately, managerial compensation schemes able to induce the said “unlimited liability 
behavior” are mostly a hypothetical possibility which one rarely encounters in corporate 
remuneration practice. Therefore, counting on financial intermediation disruptions following from 




The lending bank interaction with the borrower takes the form of a leader-follower game in which 
the bank is the leader and the firm is the follower. If a firm approaches a bank with a credit 
request, the latter makes an interest rate take-it-or-leave-it offer and the former decides on the loan 
volume based on this offer. That is, the firm formulates an optimal reaction to every value of the 
proposed lending rate (reaction function) and the bank sets the lending rate based on the 
information it has about this reaction function.
13 
The action of a bank depends on whether it is the original wholesale bank which negotiates the 
loan or the negotiations are delegated to a relationship banker. In the first case, the bank has a 
belief distribution over the borrower’s productivity value A as a whole (convolution of beliefs 
about S and L). In the second case, we assume that the delegated loan manager knows type L 
exactly (just like the firm manager) and only faces systemic uncertainty regarding S. As a result, 
the wholesale banker sets a common interest rate for all borrowers, whereas relationship bankers 
with delegation set separate rates for individual types. 
Banks are assumed risk-neutral. The bank faces a cost of funds which, for simplicity, we denote 
by i (the same as the deposit rate for retail investors) and assume a linear funding price regardless 
of volume. In section 5, we will look at the consequences of relaxing the last of these three 
assumptions. Deviations from either of the first two assumptions can be easily accommodated in 
the model as well, but are of subordinate importance for the subject of the paper. 
We formulate the rate-setting problem of the delegated loan manager first. In the notation of the 
previous subsection, a firm of type L borrows B=zm+b, where the optimal quantities of both 
components are determined by the optimality conditions (6). Thus, from (6a), with m ˆ  and 
















.     (8) 
Since we have agreed that m is in fixed supply for each firm (price z equalizes this supply with 
optimal demand), one can drop the hat in the notation:  m m = ˆ . Further, b ˆ  can be expressed 
through L, m, q, r, and θ=θ(S
d) by using (6b). Often, the expression can be made explicit. For 
instance, for the Cobb-Douglas production function f(k,m)=k
αm
1-α the named first-order 
conditions imply that for optimally chosen physical and human capital, k ˆ and m ˆ ,  
() () m Lr m k f ˆ ˆ , ˆ 1 1 α
α
αθ − − = . Then, the preferred loan volume under lending rate r is equal to 
() q mr L
r r
r
q m k Lf
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13 Since we make no further restrictions on the bank profit (e.g. no zero-profit assumption meant to imitate 
perfect competition), this set-up endows the bank with market power. The fact that, generically, a bank-client 
relationship is not fully competitive on either part was recognized by the literature a long time ago. Santomero 
(1984) is an example of this early consensus. A more specific (and recent) example of imperfect competition 
modeling has to do with the concept of client “catch-up” in a specific bank – see e.g. Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Dell’Ariccia (2004) or Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004). Financial Frictions, Bubbles, and Macroprudential Policies   15 
 
In all cases, we will write B=B(r) for the firm’s choice of loan volume, by omitting the remaining 
arguments whenever it does not cause confusion. 
Remark One can imagine situations in which the optimal level of physical capital is below the 
already available equity capital q, i.e., the firm does not need to finance physical capital by debt. It 
only has to borrow zm to finance “current first period expenditures”, i.e., to pay for the human 
capital input. However, one can show that limiting lending to zm is infeasible as an equilibrium 
outcome for many important special cases. For instance, under the Cobb-Douglas production, 
banks would be unwilling to lend at a finite rate to such firms. Therefore, we will not consider 
such cases in this paper. In the numeric examples to be discussed later, the equilibrium debt levels 
turn out to far exceed the current expenditure needs anyway. 
The revenue from the loan is (1+r)B(r) if the realization of S is above S
d (the firm survives) and 
k m k SLf ˆ ) , ˆ ( +  if S<S
d. The cost is (1+i)B(r) in both cases. The expected profit is taken over 
realizations of S (L is known) and can be written as 
() ( ) ( ) ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ˆ ˆ ) , ( r B i r B r S X k S X f L S r L J
d d d RB + − + + + Ψ =
+ − .   (9) 
In (9), superscript RB refers to relationship banker and  f ˆ  is shorthand for the production function 
value under the optimal choice of the firm. The loan manager chooses r to maximize the right-
hand side of (9) with knowledge of the loan demand function given by (8). When this 
maximization problem has a (finite) solution, and, under this solution, the firm equity is priced 
according to (3) or (3C), we obtain an equilibrium lending rate for the delegated loan management 
case for the firms belonging to type (industry) L. This rate is type-dependent. 
When the wholesale bank sets the rate for all firms itself without delegation, it has the objective 
function obtained by taking the expectation over L of the right-hand side of (9). That is 
(superscript AL refers to the arm’s length handling of credit provision), 
∫ = dL L r L J r J
RB AL ) ( ) , ( ) ( ψ ,      (10) 
where ψ is the probability density function of the public’s (hence also wholesale banks’) beliefs 
about L. In both the retail and the wholesale bank cases, the stock price p (equivalently, the 




AL both have at most one internal maximum r
*(q) in r for every value of q. It is 
given by the obvious first-order condition 
0 *) ( *) ( *) ( = − = i r B r N r J r r r .     (11) 
In (11), the superscript is dropped for notational economy and N denotes the sum of the four first 
terms on the right-hand side of (9) in the relationship banking case and their L-expectation as 
given by the right-hand side of (10) in the wholesale banking case. Subscripts denote partial 
derivatives. 
For the equilibrium to exist, the curves r
*(q) and q
*=q0+p
*(r) must intersect in the (q,r)-plane. 
(Here, p
* is the stock price of the borrower, determined in subsection 3.2 as a function of lending 16   Alexis Derviz 
 
 
rate r; this is a function if the price satisfies (3) and a correspondence if it satisfies (3C)). If the 
curves do not intersect, the equilibrium does not exist. If they intersect at more than one point, 
there are multiple equilibria. In the next section, we discuss quantitative properties of the model 
equilibria, which we have obtained by numerically solving the equation system (3), (11) with 
respect to variables q (equity capital) and r (the lending rate). Equilibria with and without bubbles 
will be compared. 
 
4. Bubbly and Bubble-Free Equilibria 
 
4.1 Bubble Definition 
 
The equilibria of the model differ depending on the lending management regime, so that there are 
two categories of them. The first is arm’s length (henceforth denoted AL) loan management, 
where there is one lending rate for all borrowers. The second is relationship banking (RB), where 
there is one lending rate for each borrower type L. Recall that the stock price, equal to share 
capital less the foundation stake (p=q-k0), is in both cases common to all firm types, since retail 
investors in every stock have the same imperfect information about type as wholesale banks. In 
the following, we show the results for the simplified situation of just two productivity types, 
deviating downwards or upwards from the average (so that L∈{Ld,Lu}, Ld<Lu), in which loan 
management is either AL or RB for all firms at once. If there were more than two elements in set 
L, one could also consider different wholesale banks choosing different subsets of L in which to 
try out delegation, but this ramification is left outside the present analysis. 
Bubbles in the present model are not posited ad hoc but are an endogenous consequence of 
incorrect initial public information. 
Information held by retail investors and wholesale banks alike is parameterized by the value λ 
giving the perceived proportion of high-productivity firms in the economy. As a possible 
justification of the situations in which the public knowledge of λ is incorrect, one can think of a 
biased prior belief distribution common to all agents.
14 Every firm, although unable to 
communicate its productivity type credibly to anyone but its relationship banker, is nonetheless 
able to send an unbiased, even if noisy, public signal about its type. Then, the Bayesian belief 
update procedure results in a reduction (depending on the relative variances of the signal noise 
and the prior belief distributions), albeit never complete elimination, of the prior error in the 
public perception. That is, a portion of the prior bias is preserved even though the signal sent by 
each firm is unbiased and is processed rationally.  
When the solution of the equation system (3), (11) is being sought, the relevant value of λ is the 
one characterizing the beliefs and not the actual proportion of high-productivity firms (by the law 
                                                           
14 The assumption of common prior beliefs was made to simplify the analysis of public sentiment implications. It 
can be easily relaxed if there are reasons to consider belief differentials across important subcategories of 
economic agents. Financial Frictions, Bubbles, and Macroprudential Policies   17 
 
of large numbers, it should be the same thing when the bias is zero). This is because the perceived 
λ enters both the retail investor and the wholesale banker decision problem (delegated loan 
managers already know the exact borrower type, so that for them the value of λ is irrelevant). The 
true λ is important for determining economy-wide aggregates (e.g. investment, bank credit, and 
average output) after individual decision problems have been solved and equilibrium established. 
In a dynamic extension of the present two-period model, one would probably expect the firms to 
send signals about productivity type repeatedly, so that the initial bias could become vanishingly 
small in the absence of shocks to the private productivity component. 
Another natural generalization would concern a more rich space of firm types, in which case the 
definition of prior beliefs affected by sentiment would also have to be modified. This issue is left 
for future research. 
 
4.2 Quantitative Implications of Bubbles 
We proceed by showing the results of the equilibrium calculation in the unbiased sentiment case 
and then discuss the changes caused by either optimistic or pessimistic prejudice.
15 
The following functional forms were used throughout the calculations. Retail investors have a 
negative exponential utility of final wealth with the absolute risk aversion coefficient 0.3. Firms 
have a Cobb-Douglas production function with physical capital share α=1/3 (see the discussion 
after equation (8) in subsection 3.3). Systemic productivity component S is log-normally 
distributed with s=logS having mean -0.125 and standard deviation 0.5. Accordingly, the mean 
value of S is unity. The chosen values of other relevant parameters are listed in the notes to the 
individual tables featuring the calculation results. 
The results for the unbiased sentiment case are shown in Table 1. As one might expect, more 
high-productivity firms (i.e., higher value λ, both perceived and actual as long as there is no prior 
bias) in the economy means more equity investment, but also higher lending rates (for everyone in 
the AL case and on average for the RB case). A less obvious outcome is a fall in bank credit, 
investment, and output for each individual type at the same time as the aggregate values of these 
fundamentals grow with λ. This is a sort of “income effect”: when high-productivity firms are 
more numerous, less effort is needed to attain a given level of expected output. 
Further, looking specifically at the equilibria in the relationship banking environment, one sees 
that lending rates for low-productivity firms fall (moderately) with growing λ, whereas they grow 
with λ for high-productivity firms. At the same time, higher λ corresponds to higher levels of bank 
credit, investment, and output in the low-productivity segment, but lower levels of the same 
fundamentals in the high-productivity segment. 
Finally, for each fixed λ, aggregate investment, bank credit, and output (we will refer to them 
collectively as “economic activity”) are lower in RB economies than in AL ones. This is true 
when public sentiment is unbiased but can be violated under some realizations of prior prejudice. 
That is, it turns out that in the world we have created it is often welfare improving to know less, 
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i.e., not to delegate lending to loan managers who know the borrower type, rather than more (the 
effect is due to the cheaper credit that, on average, the imperfectly informed wholesale banks 
charge everybody; relationship banks, by contrast, charge low-productivity borrowers a 
disproportionately high risk premium). So, in our model, not unlike the developed economies 
shortly before the outbreak of the latest crisis, banks are tempted to refrain from the costly use of 
intermediary agents with superior information and instead grant loans based on general formal 
rules (this is the essence of the AL-approach). Potentially, AL could also mean transferring loans 
to third parties whose ability to gain “soft” information on borrowers is minimal. 
Note that all the discussed effects result from a complex interplay between equity and debt 
markets, i.e., they cannot be obtained by simply combining the two partial-equilibrium models of 
each market separately. In the latter, investment and output would always fall with rising lending 
rate (like in the IS-equation of the old Keynesian models), and the same is true for the equity 
price. Looking at Table 1, one immediately sees that our approach renders substantially different 
reduced-form behavior patterns of the basic fundamentals. 
Next, let us turn to the role of bias in public perception, and the resulting equity bubbles. The 
results are collected in Table 2. Within each borrower type, the determination of the equilibrium 
equity price and lending rate depends on the perception (not the actual λ), i.e., it does not depend 
on prior bias as such. The difference between subjective beliefs and reality matters for the 
observed economic aggregates. As expected, aggregate bank credit, as well as investment and 
output, grow along with the actual proportion of high-productivity firms. On the other hand, for 
every fixed value of actual λ, economic activity falls with growing perceived λ. In other words, 
there exists an aggregate cost of incorrect economic sentiment. In this respect, RB economies are 
slightly less sensitive to prior bias than AL economies, and it may also occasionally happen that 
the RB output under a particular sentiment value exceeds the AL output (as when perceived λ is 
0.4 and the actual one is 0.6 in our example). In all cases, inspection of Table 2 suggests that, for a 
fixed absolute size of sentiment error, it is socially preferable when people are pessimistic. This 
follows from comparing economic activity for, say, the combination actual λ=0.4, perceived λ=0.5 
with the combination actual λ=0.5, perceived λ=0.4, etc. It remains to be seen to what extent this 
particular result is influenced by the orthodox efficient market paradigm of equity pricing used. 
The use of the latter paradigm may also be responsible for the relatively high sensitivity of 
economic activity values to sentiment changes: whereas the interest rate changes by 0.1 percent, 
the output values shift by 3 percent or more under a 0.1-size change of sentiment (i.e., the 
perceived λ-value). 
 
5. Macro-Prudential Capital Charges and Bubble Containment 
In this section, we will test the ability of the constructed model to address the real effects of 
macroprudential regulation of financial intermediaries. The prime objective of such regulation is 
to contain the size of asset price bubbles before they burst (see, for example, Posen, 2009, for a 
review). We first calculate the equilibria with macroprudential bank capital surcharges in a 
bubble-free economy in subsection 5.1, and then analyze the ability of the same instrument to Financial Frictions, Bubbles, and Macroprudential Policies   19 
 
reduce the real effects of a bubble caused by biased sentiment (4.2). Finally, we compare the 
effect with that of a monetary tightening (4.3). 
There is enough reliable evidence that the debt volume grows and its quality deteriorates much 
faster in the run-up to a financial crisis than in normal times. Therefore, policymakers have for 
some time been looking for an adequate means to dampen unusual debt expansions and prevent 
credit bubbles without tethering “genuine” growth. One of the instances of this search is the 
discussion of an “anti-cyclical” reform of the Basel II capital requirements on banks. At the 
moment, reliable recipes for separating bubbles from sustainable growth are unavailable. So, most 
probably, in the pursuit of their financial stability goals, most regulators would resort to simple 
penalties for suspicious credit expansions by mandating the attribution of increased risk weights 
to all lending that visibly exceeds the accepted target. That is, the macroprudential policy 
instruments one is most likely to see are capital requirements for – and hence additional costs of 
funding of – incompletely collateralized loans, requirements that would grow convexly with loan 
volume. In the present model, we can accommodate such an instrument by replacing the linear 
cost-of-funds term in the bank objective function by a linear-quadratic term that contains a 
surcharge on the loan volume in proportion to growing borrower leverage. That is, we model an 
instrument formally resembling the much-discussed Financial Stability Levy (FSL) on liabilities 
of banks, which would force the latter to apply a similar metric to their asset side as well. 
Formally, we introduce the following macro-prudential control mechanism into the model. If the 
target level of physical capital of the borrower is k and the loan size is B, the bank is subject to an 










) 1 ( B
k
a
B i + + . This means that 
(a) funding costs are growing as a convex function of the loan volume and not linearly as the 
original equation (9) stated; 
(b) the surcharge is proportional to the product of the loan volume and the borrower’s debt-to-
physical capital ratio; every additional unit of credit is penalized unless offset by physical 
capital collateral financed with equity; 
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5.1 No-Bubble Equilibria 
The calculation of equilibrium under prudential capital surcharges can proceed in the same way as 
before, with only term N in equation (11) to be modified in accordance with the new definition of 
funding costs. We show the results for the base case of equal borrower type weights and no prior 
bias in Table 3. For the sake of accurate comparison with the original model without prudential 
policy instruments, we assume that the extra funding costs carried by the banks are turned back 
over to the private sector in the form of transfers (e.g. tax relief) and, therefore, are included in the 
aggregate output measures. 
Upon inspecting Table 3 we see that macroprudential policies in the defined form are successful 
in one immediate objective: to reduce the aggregate loss given default figures. The downside is an 
increase in the price of credit and the resulting burden on economic activity. The bulk of this 
burden is carried by high-productivity borrowers, so that their distance from low-productivity 
ones in terms of investment and output is now smaller. In the present model, high-productivity 
firms take on more risks and default more frequently than those in the low-productivity segment. 
So, if the objective of macroprudential policies is to put a check on the expansion of the riskiest 
segments of the bank loan market, it is being achieved through dampening economic activity in 
the high-productivity segment. On the other hand, if the stabilization objective of the 
macroprudential instrument involves the number of defaults (this can be the case if each default 
carries a negative externality irrespective of size), then its introduction in our environment is 
clearly counter-productive: the number of defaults is now higher. And since the relationship 
banking regime in general is more favorable to high-productivity firms, the costs of new policies 
are higher in RB-economies as well. 
Naturally, the actual raison d’être for a macroprudential tool of the above type is its ability to 
stabilize inflation and output in the medium run, i.e., it can only fully transpire in a dynamic 
environment. In the latter, if the clean-up after a bursting bubble is a matter of a single-period 
public expenditure, whereas the output reduction due to a restrictive macroprudential stance is 
permanent, this type of policy becomes even more costly. This is a possibility to be taken 
seriously, because the effect in terms of expensive credit and low investment is likely to carry 
over from the present two-period to a multi-period model. Therefore, it would be always welfare-
improving if one had a capital charge mechanism that could minimize the side effects for quality 
borrowers. To cover this ground, we considered a variant of the present model with proportional 
liability rules for firm management remuneration, which effectively induces unlimited-liability 
decisions on capital structure and input purchases. This is how we explore the conjecture that a 
welfare-improving capital requirement policy may aim at encouraging lending to personally liable 
borrowers and penalizing excessive exposure to borrowers with conventional limited liability. 
Supporting evidence in the present setting is provided by a comparison of the outcomes of the 
benchmark model (limited-liability borrowers) with those of the model under the said imitation of 
unlimited liability behavior (cf. the remark at the end of subsection 3.2).
17 The comparison (under 
                                                           
17 Recall that the considered behavior of the borrower firm does not mean that the lender gets full repayment in 
all states of nature, of which in adverse states of nature (output less than debt service, i.e., default) a part of the 
compensation comes from the borrower’s private wealth. As before, in default the jointly available assets of the 
firm and its management are insufficient to service the debt. All that is assumed here is that the firm manager 
compensation is an affine function of firm earnings less debt service. In that case, the manager would select 
production inputs as if the firm operated under unlimited liability. Financial Frictions, Bubbles, and Macroprudential Policies   21 
 
equal productivity type weights and unbiased public sentiment) is summarized in Table 4. We see 
that the induced mimicry of unlimited liability behavior has four major consequences compared to 
the benchmark: 
(a) the lending rates of both productivity types get quite close in the RB case and approach 
the common lending rate of the LA case, 
(b) there is a sharp increase in the equity value of the high-productivity type, and a minor 
decrease in the equity value of the low-productivity type, 
(c) the default probability of the high-productivity type falls substantially, whereas for the 
low-productivity type, although formally increasing, this probability remains negligible, 
(d) economic activity experiences a minor reduction compared to the limited liability 
borrower behavior. 
 
If the prime concern of the policymaker is to find a macroprudential policy without a major 
negative impact on economic activity, unlimited liability mimicry by borrowers, if one could get 
near it, would have an advantage over the previously considered convex capital surcharge 
instrument, provided one were at the same time able to encourage delegated loan management in 
banks. Indeed, suppose that unlimited liability mimicry is impossible to implement in the AL 
regime, but possible in the RB regime (that is, the relationship banker is able to influence the 
manager incentive structure in the borrowing firm). In that case, the trade-off for the 
macroprudential policy is between a convex capital surcharge in wholesale banks against 
unlimited borrower liability mimicry in the RB regime without capital surcharges. Comparing the 
upper right panel of Table 3 with the lower right panel of Table 4, one sees that the losses in 
economic activity caused by abandonment of limited liability are more than compensated by the 
possibility to give up additional capital requirements. A reduction in default rates comes as a 
bonus on top of that. 
 
5.2 Economic Activity under a Bubble, and Containment Alternatives 
Now we go over to the description of the same outcomes as in the previous subsection, but in the 
presence of a bubble. The experiment we conduct uses a positive bubble generated by a prior 
belief of 40% low-productivity producers, whereas their true proportion is 60%. The results are 
collected in Table 5. 
In all three lending regimes considered (baseline with limited borrower liability and without 
macroprudential capital charges, under macroprudential capital charges, and under proportional 
downside risk of the borrower management), the bubble means higher equity prices compared to 
the no-bubble benchmark. The extent of equity overvaluation is somewhat higher under delegated 
loan management. Average output, on the other hand, is lower under the bubble. A little 
surprisingly, default probabilities are lower compared to the benchmark. Apparently, the 
mechanism of this reduction has to do with lower interest rates charged to high-productivity firms 
under optimistic sentiment. 22   Alexis Derviz 
 
 
Under the arms’ length bank business model, the most important finding in the context of our 
objective is that in the presence of the macroprudential instrument, bubble removal (restoration of 
unbiased sentiment) has a marginally stronger impact on both the equity price and output than in 
the baseline. In the considered case of a positive bubble, the equity price falls and output rises 
when the bubble disappears, the same as in the baseline. The difference between bubbly and no-
bubble interest rates is also mildly stronger. Unfortunately, this effect is achieved at the cost of a 
reduced absolute level of economic activity. 
Under loan management delegation (relationship banking), the quantitative effects of the 
macroprudential capital charges are even less convincing, since, compared to the baseline, both 
the output gain and the bubbly price correction are smaller. The adverse absolute impact on output 
is even more severe than in the AL business model. Altogether, macroprudential policies in a 
relationship banking environment can, according to the present analysis, be very disappointing 
due to their inability to exploit the informational advantages of delegated loan managers. 
On the other hand, enforcing firm manager downside risk, if feasible, could both reduce the 
sensitivity of the real economy to the asset price bubble and (the same as in the no-bubble 
benchmark) improve the absolute output levels.
18 
The conducted exercise suggests that the convex macro-prudential capital charge on bank loans 
has two main advantages. First, it helps investors coordinate on an equilibrium mix of equity and 
debt financing in situations in which equilibria do not exist in the absence of this instrument. In 
our model this happens particularly when firm productivity types are distributed very unevenly or 
when public economic sentiment is highly biased. Second, by discouraging imprudent leverage of 
highly productive borrowers, it helps to reduce loss given default. 
On the contrary, the main problems associated with the use of this instrument can be seen in 
-  a uniform and significant increase in lending rates for all borrowers, 
-  an increase in default rates (which may be a problem if they are associated with welfare 
externalities not considered in the model), 
-  excessive sensitivity of investment and output to small changes of the capital charge rate 
(this has to do with the additional transmission channel through equity markets). 
Above all, the discussed macroprudential instrument contributes very slightly to suppressing the 
most immediate consequence of biased sentiment, i.e., equity price bubbles. Its performance on 
the real economy side of bubble containment is marred by the overall dampening impact on 
investment and output. 
                                                           
18 The key adverse property of the standard limited liability arrangement is that the borrower is not motivated to 
distinguish between “dead” and “deader” outcomes under default: the consequences are the same whether 
insolvency size is large or small. Formally, as discussed at the end of subsection 3.2, this means that the firm 
decides input purchases and investment by only taking into account no-default realizations of the uncertainties it 
faces. Had the mangers received some (e.g. delayed) remuneration even under default with an inverse 
dependence on the loss size, their decisions would have more resembled the socially preferable ones from (6UL). 
In practice, this means that a part of the manager fee would have to be earmarked and excluded from seizure by 
the creditor at default. Naturally, such a scheme would require a change in the usual insolvency laws and 
possible encouragement by an appropriate tax treatment. Financial Frictions, Bubbles, and Macroprudential Policies   23 
 
More generally, there seem to be limits, in terms of economic activity and ex ante welfare costs, 
to promoting financial stability through policies directed at credit providers. At the same time, 
policies with the unchanged ultimate objective of credit bubble prevention, but directed at credit 
consumers, have largely remained unexplored (let alone exploited). Our results indicate that the 
potential gain from such re-orientation from regulating credit supply to educating credit demand 
may be worthwhile, notwithstanding numerous implementation difficulties. 
 
5.3 Macroprudential vs. Monetary Policy 
Having seen the consequences of bubble containment by means of the macroprudential instrument 
introduced, we shall now compare the result with the workings of a more traditional monetary 
policy tool. We model monetary policy as an exogenous simultaneous change in the funding cost 
and the deposit interest rate value i. That is, whilst monetary policy affects the linear component 
of banks’ financing costs (irrespective of whether this financing comes from deposits or the 
money market), the macroprudential tool leaves this linear component unchanged but adjusts the 
curvature of the non-linear cost component.
19 
For concreteness, calculations were conducted for our basic limited borrower liability case and 
unbiased sentiment. Variations in the value of i led to equilibria which, with respect to variables 
characterizing economic activity, were hard to distinguish from the ones obtained from the 
baseline case by introducing the macroprudential tool of the preceding subsections. In particular, 
we found that under the used parameterization, average output, investment, equity prices, and 
lending rates react to the macroprudential tool in roughly the same way as they would react to a 
0.5% increase in the value of interest rate i. Conversely, economic activity returns, more or less, 
to the baseline level when the macroprudential policy is compensated by a 0.5% monetary policy 
easing (reduction of i). The results of the latter experiment are shown in detail in Table 6. 
What is the difference, then, between the two policy effects? Inspection of Table 6 suggests that 
there may be a minor increase in default rates (in the high productivity, hence risky, borrower 
segment) under active policies compared to the no-policy baseline, but, given the chosen level of 
precision, this increase barely lies outside the confidence bounds. Much more important is the 
comparison of the effects on bank earnings: they are significantly higher under the 
macroprudential tightening-monetary easing policy mix than in the baseline. This fact indicates 
that, should it come to a counter-cyclical action by the monetary authority, banks would prefer 
macroprudential activism to monetary tightening. This outcome can be interpreted as follows: 
monetary policy affects bank funding costs uniformly and jointly with the firm equity and 
household deposit markets. On the other hand, the considered macroprudential tool immediately 
affects only the lender-borrower link and allows the bank to pass higher funding costs on to the 
real sector more easily. 
Altogether, both policy instruments, i.e., macroprudential and monetary, contribute superficially 
to suppressing equity price bubbles, but show a very disappointing record of fighting other credit 
                                                           
19 Naturally, the sign of a bank’s funding costs dependence on policy rates may vary with its balance sheet 
structure. Here, we have a stylized textbook case of a bank with just deposits and own capital on the liability 
side, so that this question does not arise. 24   Alexis Derviz 
 
 
excess phenomena such as default probabilities. Quite importantly, their performance on the real 
economy side of bubble containment is marred by the overall dampening impact on investment 
and output. 
6. Conclusion 
We have constructed a model of a financial sector in a production economy subject to equity price 
bubbles. Our model accommodates endogenously mixed equity-debt financing of production. 
Further, it contains a flexible agency-based rationale for the role of banks and a workable 
quantification of the notion of economic sentiment (often considered a “soft”, non-quantifiable 
concept) within an integrated macro-financial modeling setup. Additionally, we are able to 
investigate the real economic implications of macroprudential policies motivated by financial 
stability considerations. The main building blocks of this model are 
-  constrained diversification of stock holdings by retail investors, 
-  exclusive access to financial intermediation technology by wholesale banks, 
-  choice between delegated and arm’s length loan management by wholesale banks, 
-  prior beliefs (public sentiment) about the productivity risks of firms, generating equity 
price bubbles that feed into investment, interest rates, and output. 
 
We formulate an equation system characterizing equilibrium for the cases with and without 
delegation of lending by wholesale banks. We also introduce a macroprudential regulatory policy 
resulting in a convex dependence of bank funding costs on the quantity of uncollateralized credit. 
Then we conduct comparative statics exercises with the help of numeric solutions to this system 
for a number of important cases. Those include: shifts in the prior economic sentiment of the 
public which lead to equity price bubbles; variations in the size of non-linear regulatory capital 
charges linked to unsecured loans; and relaxation of the conventional limited liability constraint 
on borrower behavior. 
Limited liability proves to be one of the main sources of equilibrium fragility: under many 
combinations of parameter values, equilibrium does not exist for pure limited liability borrowers 
but exists when borrowers mimic unlimited liability in their decisions under the pressure of 
specially designed incentives. 
Our exercise has shown that the sensitivity of the economy to biased investor sentiment is not 
visibly reduced by macroprudential policies of the considered type. Introducing a macroprudential 
instrument does allow the regulator to reduce loss given default levels (across the bubble sizes 
considered), even though the default frequency marginally rises instead of falling. On the other 
hand, the dampening effect on absolute economic activity is considerable. This contrasts with the 
effect of introducing downside risk for borrower management. Such a policy, if one could 
implement it by an appropriate regulatory design on the lender side or other policies, is able to 
remove a large portion of the real economic sensitivity to equity price bubbles. Financial Frictions, Bubbles, and Macroprudential Policies   25 
 
The quantitative characteristics of equilibrium in our model are quite sensitive to several 
exogenous parameters, such as the initial level of own capital of the borrower. The effect is 
particularly strong in the textbook Cobb-Douglas production environment, but might be somewhat 
mitigated in the presence of convex capital installation costs. The main qualitative outcomes of 
both bubble bursting and changes in macroprudential policy stance survive adjustments to the 
technology definition such as capital installation costs. So, the production side of the model is 
reasonably robust. 
In contrast, robustness is less likely on the equity market side. In the present version of the model, 
we have employed the standard (“Walrasian”) asset pricing paradigm. The latter is used to price 
company equity and hence also determine – without frictions, in a one-to-one relation – the level 
of equity-financed physical capital. In this environment, cases in which equilibrium either 
becomes indeterminate or falls apart are common. It is possible that the relaxation of this 
unrealistic frictionless link between the stock price and investment will be able to reduce some 
counter-intuitive effects, such as the behavior of default frequency in the high-productivity 
borrower segment. However, the main conclusion about the economic activity implications of 
macroprudential tightening is unlikely to be reversed. The quantitative treatment of this question 
is left to future research. 
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λ=0.4  λ=0.5  λ=0.6 
Indicator ↓    Aggregate    Aggregate   Aggregate 
q  3.244 3.328 3.398 
r  0.074 0.075 0.076 
Bd  16.391 16.055  15.649 






kd 17.256  17.017  16.698 






yd  21.088 20.832  20.489 
AL 






qd  3.009 3.138 3.267 
qu  3.389 3.413 3.440 
rd  0.081 0.080 0.079 
ru  0.070 0.072 0.075 
Bd  14.304 14.433 14.575 






kd  15.055 15.299 15.555 






yd  18.718 18.981 19.257 
RB 







Notes: The foundation stake q0 in firm equity is at level 0.2. The cost of lendable funds (deposit rate) is 
0.03. For firms of type #, q# is total equity capital, r# is the borrowing rate, B# is the volume of 
credit taken, k# is the total investment in physical capital, y# is expected gross output (when the 
systemic productivity factor takes its expected value of 1), AL is arm’s length loan management, 
and RB is relationship banking (delegated loan management). 
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λ=0.4  λ=0.5  λ=0.6 
True value of λ →  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.4  0.5  0.6 
  Indicator ↓   
q  3.244 3.244 3.244 3.328 3.328 3.328 3.398 3.398 3.398 
r  0.074 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.076 0.076 
B  19.595 20.396 21.197  19.069  19.823 20.576  18.516 19.232 19.949 
k  20.072 20.776 21.480  19.663  20.324 20.986  19.211 19.839  20.467 
AL 
y  24.443 25.282 26.120  24.014  24.809 25.605  23.534 24.296  25.057 
qd  3.009 3.009  3.009  3.138 3.138  3.138  3.267 3.267  3.267 
qu  3.389 3.389  3.389  3.413 3.413  3.413  3.440 3.440  3.440 
rd  0.081 0.081  0.081  0.080 0.080  0.080  0.079 0.079 0.079 
ru  0.070 0.070  0.070  0.072 0.072  0.072  0.075 0.075 0.075 
B  19.061 20.396 21.197 18.499 19.516 20.533 18.062 18.933 19.805 
k  19.495 20.605 21.715 19.050 19.988 20.926 18.723 19.515 20.307 
RB 
y  23.820 25.096 26.372 23.353 24.446 25.539 23.009 23.946 24.884 
 
Notes: The foundation stake q0 in firm equity is at level 0.2. The cost of lendable funds (deposit rate) is 
0.03. For firms of type #, q# is total equity capital and r# is the borrowing rate; variables without 
subscripts denote economy-wide aggregates; B is the volume of credit taken, k is the total 
investment in physical capital, y is expected gross output (when the systemic productivity factor 
takes its expected value of 1), AL is arm’s length loan management, and RB is relationship banking 
(delegated loan management). 30   Alexis Derviz 
 
 




Prudential capital surcharge →  No Yes 
Indicator ↓    Aggregate   Aggregate 
q  3.328 2.999 
r  0.075 0.085 
Ld  +0 +0  Default 
probability  Lu  0.025 0.039 
Loss given default  20.593  17.193 
Bd  16.055 13.304 




kd 17.017  14.101 




yd  20.832 17.684 
AL 




qd  3.138 2.756 
qu  3.413 3.099 
rd  0.080 0.094 
ru  0.072 0.081 
Ld  +0 +0  Default 
probability  Lu  0.022 0.034 
Loss given default  22.937  19.586 
Bd  14.433 11.437 




kd  15.299 12.116 




yd  18.981 15.528 
RB 





Notes:  Results are shown for the perceived share λ=0.5 of high-productivity borrowers and no prior bias. 
The base capital surcharge a is 1 percent per 1
st unit of credit uncollateralized by physical capital. 
The foundation stake q0 in firm equity is at level 0.2. The cost of lendable funds (deposit rate) is 
0.03. For firms of type #, q# is total equity capital, r# is the borrowing rate, B# is the volume of 
credit taken, k# is the total investment in physical capital, y# is expected gross output (when the 
systemic productivity factor takes its expected value of 1), AL is arm’s length loan management, 
and RB is relationship banking (delegated loan management). Loss given default is the expectation 
with respect to the productivity distribution conditioned on default. 
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Table 4: Economic Fundamentals in Equilibrium when Borrower Incentives Replicate either 
Limited or Unlimited Liability Conditions 
 
 
Borrower incentives →  LL-consistent UL-consistent 
Indicator ↓    Aggregate   Aggregate 
q  3.328 3.916 
r  0.075 0.075 
Ld  +0 +0  Default 
probability  Lu  0.025 0.00086 
Bd  16.055 15.505 




kd 17.017  17.053 




yd  20.832 20.870 
AL 




qd  3.138 3.072 
qu  3.413 3.881 
rd  0.080 0.076 
ru  0.072 0.077 
Ld  +0 0.000051  Default 
probability  Lu  0.022 0.00062 
Bd  14.433 15.879 




kd  15.299 16.606 




yd  18.981 20.390 
RB 





Notes:  Results are shown for the perceived share λ=0.5 of high-productivity borrowers and no prior bias. 
The foundation stake q0 in firm equity is at level 0.2. The cost of lendable funds (deposit rate) is 
0.03. For firms of type #, q# is total equity capital, r# is the borrowing rate, B# is the volume of 
credit taken, k# is the total investment in physical capital, y# is expected gross output (when the 
systemic productivity factor takes its expected value of 1), AL is arm’s length loan management, 
and RB is relationship banking (delegated loan management). Borrower management incentives are 
either consistent with limited liability (LL) or imitate unlimited liability (UL). 
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Table 5: Bubble, Bank Business Model, and Regulatory Stance 
 
 
Notes: AL – arm’s length loan management, RB – relationship banking (delegated loan management) 
 Equity  price  Output  Interest rate  Default probability 
Bubble: Y/N  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Productivity type  Low High  Low High 
Baseline  3.198 3.044 23.534 24.443  7.57%  7.40% +0 0.0163 +0 0.0384 
Relative difference between 
bubble and no-bubble 
outcomes 
5.07% -3.72%        
Macroprudential instrument  2.871 2.731 20.170 20.961  8.54%  8.37% +0 0.0263 +0 0.0580 
Relative difference between 
bubble and no-bubble 
outcomes 
5.13% -3.77%        
Downside borrower risk  3.724 3.722 23.606 24.038  7.51%  7.41% +0 0.0007 +0 0.0009 
AL 
Relative difference between 
bubble and no-bubble 
outcomes 
0.04% -1.80%        
Baseline  3.136 2.961 23.009 23.820  7.69%  7.51% +0 0.0153 +0 0.0319 
Relative difference between 
bubble and no-bubble 
outcomes 
5.92% -3.41%        
Macroprudential instrument  2.776 2.631 19.430 20.234  8.77%  8.53%  +0  0.0241 0.0001 0.0471 
Relative difference between 
bubble and no-bubble 
outcomes 
5.53% -3.97%        
Downside borrower risk  3.337 3.052 22.524 22.714  7.58%  7.73%  +0  0.0005 0.0008 0.0007 
RB 
Relative difference between 
bubble and no-bubble 
outcomes 
9.36% -0.84%        Financial Frictions, Bubbles, and Macroprudential Policies   33 
 
 
Table 6: Macroprudential Capital Surcharges Compensated by a Monetary Policy Easing: 
Change of Economic Fundamentals against the Baseline 
 
 
Policy stance → 
Baseline 
Macroprudential 
instrument + low key 
interest rates 
Indicator ↓    Aggregate   Aggregate 
q  3.328 3.310 
r  0.075 0.075 
Ld  +0 +0  Default 
probability  Lu  0.025 0.028 
Bd  16.055 16.165 




kd 17.017  17.104 




yd  20.832 20.925 





Bank earnings  0.883175 0.9801465 
qd  3.138 3.106 
qu  3.413 3.400 
rd  0.080 0.080 
ru  0.072 0.072 
Ld  +0 +0  Default 
probability  Lu  0.022 0.025 
Bd  14.433 14.395 




kd  15.299 15.233 




yd  18.981 18.914 





Bank earnings  0.8817475 0.976822 
 
Notes:  Results are shown for the perceived share λ=0.5 of high-productivity borrowers and no prior bias. 
The base capital surcharge a is 1 percent per 1
st unit of credit uncollateralized by physical capital. 
The foundation stake q0 in firm equity is at level 0.2. The cost of lendable funds (and the deposit 
rate) is 0.03 in the baseline and 0.025 under macroprudential measures. For firms of type #, q# is 
total equity capital, r# is the borrowing rate, B# is the volume of credit taken, k# is the total 
investment in physical capital, y# is expected gross output (when the systemic productivity factor 
takes its expected value of 1), AL is arm’s length loan management, and RB is relationship banking 
(delegated loan management). Borrowers have limited liability. 
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